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In 1953, faced with a catastrophic fall in the price of sugar, representatives of the major sugar
producing and consuming nations of the world met in London to agree a mechanism for
stabilising the international sugar market. Cuba was heavily dependent on the export of sugar
and any change in either the price received for the sugar crop, or the amount that could be
sold, had a huge effect on the island’s economy. Despite having failed to diversify its
economy into other areas to any great extent, by the 1950s Cuba had two independent markets
for its sugar exports, one provided by the United States quota system and the other being the
so-called ‘world market’. However, when the political threat of a reduction in the US quota
coincided with a heavy fall in the price on the world market, the Cuban sugar industry faced a
crisis. Alan Dye and Richard Sicotte have examined the effect of the 1956 revision of the US
quota on the political situation,1 but it is also necessary to consider events in the rest of the
world market to fully understand the nature of the economic problems and their political
consequences in the years leading up to the Cuban revolution.
Not only was sugar vital to the island’s economy, representing 80 percent of exports,
but Cuba also was the world’s largest producer, with an annual harvest in the region of 5
million tons. This made attempting to influence the market price an important policy
objective, while the sheer size of Cuban production seemed to offer the possibility of success
in manipulating the market to maintain price levels. The government tried to do this, first by a
unilateral cut in exports and then through participation in the International Sugar Agreement,
which attempted to restrict the amount of sugar on the world market by allocating a quota to
each signatory country that was smaller than their previous production. This approach had
been tried before in the 1930s with the ‘Chadbourne Plan’, when it had not been particularly
successful as other countries, not members of the scheme, had simply increased their
production and undermined the effect.2 This time, however, 44 governments were present at
the negotiations in London and the Cuban government, one of the most enthusiastic backers
of the approach, had greater hopes that the sugar price might be stabilised.
The Cuban government, which had come to power in a military coup in March 1952,
had more economic problems to solve than just the falling price of sugar. A report for the
World Bank had recommended wage cuts, easier dismissal regulations and mechanisation of
industry as part of a package to raise productivity and increase profitability by reducing the
share of the national income that went to labour. Cuban workers had a long tradition of
militant defence of their wages and conditions, and so any attempt to increase productivity –
which would have resulted in increased unemployment and lower standards of living for
Cuban workers–required an authoritarian regime capable of overcoming resistance from the
trade unions. This can be seen as one of the reasons why big business in Cuba was initially
such a strong supporter of the de facto regime lead by General Batista.
1 Alan Dye & Richard Sicotte,‘The US Sugar Program and the Cuban Revolution’, Journal of Economic
History, 64:3, pp.673-704.
2 Oscar Pino-Santos, Los años 50, Havana: Editorial Arte y Literatura, 2008, p.141.
3Given the importance of sugar for the economy, any attempt to generally increase
profitability could not succeed unless profits from sugar could be maintained, which in turn
was dependent upon arresting the fall in world prices. The method chosen to implement the
cut in exports, as required by the London Sugar Agreement, was to cut production by
shortening the harvesting period. This served the double objective of reducing the amount of
sugar on the world market, while reducing the plantation owners’wage bill because the cane
cutters were only paid during the actual harvest. Such an approach, given the militant
traditions of the sugar workers, would bring the Batista regime into direct confrontation with
the sugar workers and lead to their biggest strike for 20 years.
As both the London Sugar Agreement and the sugar workers’strike of 1955 are
largely ignored in modern historiography, this paper will trace the course of events and will
argue that, in an economy dominated by an industry that was so dependent on international
market conditions, the contradiction between the needs of capital and labour would give the
Cuban workers good reason to support the revolution in 1959. Starting from a discussion of
the detailed relationship between sugar price fluctuations and the crisis in the Cuban
economy, it will be seen how this led to participation in the London Sugar Agreement. The
fact that this in turn brought the government and employers into conflict with the sugar
workers will require an explanation of Cuban working-class politics and traditions of struggle.
Before recounting the details of the 1955 strike, the paper continues with an analysis of the
US sugar-quota system and an explanation of the manner in which American domestic
politics exacerbated the already grave problems of the Cuban sugar industry. It will finally be
argued that the different perceptions of the sugar workers and their employers as to the
outcome of the strike led to increased working-class support for the revolutionary forces at the
same time as many capitalist interests became disillusioned with the dictatorship.
The Price of Sugar and the London Sugar Agreement
Between 1895 and 1925, world production of sugar rose from 1 million to 25 million tons,
and Cuba, with annual harvests of around 5 million tons, was a very significant producer. This
significance was reflected in the dominance that sugar production had within the Cuban
economy, although throughout the early years of the republic US capital controlled the sugar
industry and consequently the wider economy.3 In the second decade of the twentieth century,
a speculative boom known as the‘Dance of the Millions’, largely financed by loans from US
banks, had collapsed and most of the Cuban industry had passed into American ownership
when the banks foreclosed.4 While originally producing almost exclusively for the American
market, the growth of internal production of both beet and cane sugar caused the US
government, faced with an efficient lobbying campaign, to increase tariffs, thereby causing
the Cuban share of the market to decline.5 This in turn led Cuba to look elsewhere and, by the
1950s, about half of the Cuban harvest was aimed at the rest of the world so that the income
from the so-called ‘world market’had developed a considerable significance in the island’s
economic affairs.6
3 Brian H. Pollitt,‘The Rise and Fall of the Cuban Sugar Economy’, Journal of Latin American Studies, 36:2
(2004), pp.319-48.
4 Brian H. Pollitt,‘The Cuban Sugar Economy and the Great Depression’, Bulletin of Latin American Research,
3:2 (1984), pp.3-28.
5 David J. Gerber,‘The United States Sugar Quota Program: A Study in the Direct Congressional Control of
Imports’, Journal of Law and Economics, 19:1 (1976), pp.103-47.
6 Marifei Pérez-Stable, The Cuban Revolution, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999, pp.14-16.
4The heightened international tension at the time of the Korean War had led to
stockpiling of sugar – then considered an important strategic foodstuff – leading to
considerable price inflation so that, by December 1951, the world price of sugar was 4.84¢ a
pound, climbing to a brief high of 5.42¢ the following March.7 This high price encouraged a
vast increase in worldwide production, with new areas being turned over to both cane and
beet farming; but, as there was not a comparable increase in consumption, the resulting crisis
of overproduction led, within a year, to a collapse in the price to a mere 3.55¢ a pound.8 At
this time Cuba was producing 18 percent of the world total and the collapse in the market was
disastrous for the Cuban economy. Cuban sugar farmers had played their part in the general
international scramble to grow more sugar, and the 1952 ‘zafra’ (sugar harvest) was the
biggest in history, at over 7 million tons compared to the previous record of 5.5 million tons
the year before. Unfortunately for the Cuban producers, however, of that 7 million tons they
were only able to sell 4.8 million.9 This posed a serious problem for the incoming
government under Fulgencio Batista, for whom the restoration of profitability was one of the
principle tasks.
The Report on Cuba, compiled for the International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development (World Bank) in 1951, had identified the principal challenge facing the Cuban
economy as low labour productivity. Its author, Francis Truslow, argued that increased
productivity would attract investment, promote diversification and thereby reduce Cuba’s
dependency on the sugar industry.10 Given the strength of the trade unions and the fear by
most workers that the productivity measures proposed would be detrimental to their income
and employment prospects, there was little possibility that the Truslow report could have been
implemented by an elected government. Rather, an authoritarian regime would be necessary
to enforce its proposals, which, at least in the short term, could only result in a considerable
increase in the already chronic level of unemployment. The army coup that brought in the
Batista dictatorship was widely seen in this light at the time,11 and this task would be made
very much more difficult if the still-dominant sugar industry ceased to be profitable. The
approach adopted by the Batista government to dealing with the sugar crisis was in line with
the methods proposed by the World Bank report.
In an attempt to cope with the immediate problems of the sugar industry, the
government purchased 1.75 million tons of the 1952 zafra to be kept in reserve and off the
open market, thus hoping to use Cuba’s dominant position in the market to stabilise the price.
The idea of a Cuban unilateral cutback in production was further extended by decree number
78, which ruled the 1953 harvest would be restricted to 5 million tons by shortening the
length of time in which cane could be cut.12 The tactic of restricting the length of the sugar
harvest was designed to increase profits for the owners of the sugar companies at the expense
of the workers. The sugar workers were only paid during the actual cane-cutting period, and
therefore, if the harvest were of shorter duration, the wage bill would be reduced. Should the
restriction be successful in raising or at least stabilising the price of sugar, this would maintain
or increase the employers’income. Critics of the strategy of restricting production were clear
at the time that only the sugar bourgeoisie could benefit from the policy of restriction, and it
7 Raúl Cepero Bonilla,‘Política azucarera’, in Obras históricas, Havana: Instituto de Historia, 1963, p.321.
8 Cepero (1963), p.347.
9 Cepero (1963), pp.329-30.
10 Francis Adams Truslow, Report on Cuba, Washington DC: International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development, 1951.
11 National Archives (NA), FO 371/97516/7 - AK1015/33.
12 Clara Emma Chávez-Álvarez, Matanzas de rojo y negro 1952-1958, Matanzas: Ediciones Matanzas, 2007
p.16.
5was portrayed as not being in the national interest.13 This illustrates the contradictions
inherent in ‘economic nationalist’politics when the nation is divided into classes with
divergent interests and, in consequence, there is no single‘national interest’.
As many of its critics predicted, the unilateral action of the Batista government was a
complete failure, as other producing countries took advantage of Cuba’s voluntary restriction
to increase their output and the price continued to fall. The national income from sugar fell
from $655.5 million in 1952 to $404.9 million in 1953, while the total wage bill fell from
$411.5 million to $253.9 million.14 Moreover, speculation, insider trading and corruption
were rampant, with those who ran the Cuban Institute for Sugar Stabilisation (Instituto
Cubano de Estabilización de Azúcar), all close allies of Batista, enriching themselves
scandalously.15 The British government also profited from the unusually low price of sugar,
by ending sugar rationing at home and buying a million extra tons from Cuba at less than 3¢ a
pound.
The chaotic situation in the world sugar market prompted the intervention of the
United Nations. In April 1953, the UN invited 78 countries to send representatives to an
international sugar conference in London, to take place in July of that year, with the intention
of negotiating an international sugar agreement. The Cuban delegation was led by Amadeo
López Castro, a close associate of Batista. The idea behind the agreement was to stabilise the
price of sugar by allocating quotas to the different producing countries, which would, in the
words of the agreement, “regulate the world sugar market and reach an equilibrium between
supply and demand that would allow the price to be maintained between the limits of 3.25 and
4.35 ¢ per pound”.16 The Cuban quota was designed to allow a zafra of 5 million tons. In the
event of the price falling below 3.25¢, quotas would be progressively cut to a maximum of 20
percent, by which point no further action was envisaged. The final agreement was signed in
August by only 38 of the 44 participating countries, while the rest of the sugar-producing
world –particularly Peru, Indonesia, Brazil, Formosa and East Germany –was not bound by
the treaty.17 Not signing the agreement and increasing production was only an option for
smaller producers whose economies were not so dependent on sugar. This may have been
short-sighted, but it represented an opportunity for growers in these smaller producing
countries to gain an income they had not previously enjoyed. If Cuba had tried this approach,
such was its importance in the world market its withdrawal would have destroyed the
agreement.
This partial nature of the International Sugar Agreement was to be its undoing, as non-
member countries could increase their production as much as they wished, while importing
countries who were signatories to the agreement were not obliged to buy exclusively from
other member states. Furthermore, the agreement only restricted production in exporting
countries but did not restrict internal production in participating importing countries: a
particularly important loophole for European sugar-beet producers. There were also two other
important sugar-regulation schemes: the Commonwealth Preference scheme and the United
States Sugar quota scheme. The latter accounted for about half the Cuban production, and
would have an important effect on the situation in the second half of the decade when US
13 Bohemia, 23 January 1955.
14 José Antonio Guerra,‘La industria azucarera cubana: 1932-1957’, Diario de la Marina, 15 September 1957.
15 Cepero (1963), pp.310-12.
16 ‘Convenio Internacional del Azucar’, Gaceta Oficial 7645, 11 January 1954.
17 Boris C. Swerling,‘The International Sugar Agreement of 1953’, American Economic Review, 44:5
(December 1954), pp.848-9.
6domestic growers succeeded in reducing the amount of sugar purchased from Cuba, thereby
exacerbating the problem caused by the reduction in income from the rest of the world market
The Commonwealth scheme–which was designed to develop sugar production in the British
Empire and which guaranteed an annual 2.5 million tons to Britain’s colonies and ex-colonies
–was an additional complication because it further reduced the potential market for Cuba.18
Thus, Cuba faced an unfortunate conjuncture with falling prices due to overproduction and a
reduction in the American and British markets because of preference to internal US and
British Empire production. Meanwhile some smaller producers took short term advantage of
the London Sugar Agreement’s attempt to reduce the amount of sugar on the market and
undermined the agreement by increasing their own production.
These defects became obvious from the beginning as the price dropped to 3.14¢ in
November 1953, thus triggering a 15 percent drop in quotas as soon as the agreement came
into force. The price continued to fall and in May 1954 another 5 percent cut in quotas was
decreed by the International Sugar Council, but to little effect as, by June, the price had fallen
to 3.05¢. The maximum cut in quota now having been reached, the agreement was powerless
to act further, although the council did suggest a further voluntary cut.19
The failure of the London Sugar Agreement to achieve its objective of stabilising the
world market sugar price between 3.25 and 4.35¢ per pound was to have serious political
repercussions in Cuba, where opponents of the regime painted the agreement as an unpatriotic
surrender to foreign interests.20 It is difficult to see how anything the government might have
done would have stopped the fall in the price of sugar, but the fact that they tried and failed
left them open to criticism. However, the critics recommended approach, which amounted to
little more than aggressively trying to sell more sugar on an unregulated market, risked a
further catastrophic fall in the world price that could have bankrupted the country.
Nevertheless, the fact that the weight of the measures adopted would fall most heavily on the
workers produced a strong reaction within the trade unions.
Working-class politics
Cuban workers had a militant history, which included the general strike in 1933 that had
played an important part in the revolution that brought down the dictatorial government of
Gerado Machado. However, the main trade union federation, the Confederación de
Trabajadores de Cuba (CTC) headed by general secretary Eusebio Mujal, had become
heavily bureaucratised and relied on government patronage to maintain its position rather than
adopting more traditional trade-union methods of collective bargaining.21 Indeed it is
commonly recognised that Mujal played an important role in supporting the Batista
dictatorship, and in return the government obliged employers to deduct trade-union
subscriptions from workers’wages by means of a compulsory check-off. In return the CTC
restrained and undermined workers attempts to resist the employers’productivity offensive
and did their best to keep the trade unions out of politics. However, despite Mujal’s best
efforts, the CTC was not a monolithic organisation and Batista had not been able to corrupt
the entire trade-union machine. As the political situation developed, the middle ground
18 Swerling (1954), p.841.
19 Arnaldo Silva Leon, Cuba y el mercado internacional azucarero, Havana: Editorial Ciencias Sociales, 1975,
pp.123-43.
20 Pino (2008) pp.135-40.
21 Hobart Spalding, Organized Labor in Latin America: historical case studies of workers in dependent societies,
New York: New York University Press, 1977, pp.227-38.
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unionists included, to choose one side or the other. As well as some honest independent trade-
union leaders, the communist Partido Socialista Popular (PSP) still had a level of influence.
This was particularly true in the countryside where social legislation was not well enforced
and, given that most urban bureaucrats avoided the rural areas, some militants, including
communists, managed to gain a following among agricultural workers.22 The nature of the
economy meant that the sugar-workers’union, the Federación Nacional de Trabajadores
Azucareros (FNTA), had always been the most important part of the Cuban labour movement.
They had a long tradition of struggle and had even set up soviets and armed militias during
the 1933 strike.23 The seasonal nature of their employment militated against bureaucratically
stable trade-union organisation, with membership numbers fluctuating widely according to
the time of year, but this saved them from the dangers of conservatism that are inherent in
traditional skilled trade unionism. Thus, for example, sugar workers had a tradition of cane-
burning sabotage as a tactic for enforcing their demands. However, the fragmenting effects of
the seasonal harvest cycle were offset by the fact that most of them lived in communities in
which they formed the overwhelming majority, thereby reinforcing workplace solidarity with
community feeling in times of industrial struggle.
By January 1955 the fall in the international price of sugar had produced an internal
crisis in the FNTA. The government had restricted the harvest to 4.75 million tons in 1953,
and a further reduction was under consideration for 1955.24 In 1954, wages and conditions
had been frozen to 1953 levels, perhaps to avoid trouble before the elections, but this was
considered by the employers to be economically unviable in view of the fall in prices and they
were looking for a pro-rata wage rate based on the price of sugar.25 This produced an outcry,
even from the moderate leader of the FNTA, José Luis Martínez.26 An unusually united
FNTA conference in January 1955 supported Martínez’s stand, with more militant elements
agitating for a strike.27 Following a round table discussion with both the employers and the
unions, the government decreed a harvest of 4.4 million tons and a 7.31 percent wage cut,
which would result in a saving for the employers of 23 million pesos, 15 percent of their wage
bill.28 The decree also authorised bulk sugar loading, a measure which would have led to
thousands of job losses. There was uproar in the FNTA conference, but Mujal persuaded the
delegates to refer the strike call to the joint CTC/FNTA executive meeting. There, away from
the pressure of the conference, Martínez and Mujal opposed a strike as impractical, saying
that the FNTA was not prepared, with a final vote of 53 to 19 against strike action.29
This conference is the first sign of a developing schism in the CTC bureaucracy and
the emergence of a left-wing opposition around Conrado Rodriguez, Conrado Becquer and
Anibal Alvarez. Following the formal acceptance of the government decree, employers in the
province of Las Villas started declaring mass redundancies and Conrado Rodriguez, the
provincial FNTA leader, publicly accused Mujal and Martínez of betrayal.30 There was
considerable disillusion at this climb down, both within the rank and file and among a
22 James O’Connor, The Origins of Socialism in Cuba, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1970, p.181.
23 Barry Carr,‘Mill Occupations and Soviets: The Mobilisation of Sugar Workers in Cuba, 1917-33’, Journal of
Latin American Studies, 28:1 (1996), p.141.
24 Bohemia, 2 January 1955.
25 NA, FO 371/108990 - AK1015/1&3 (1954), Internal situation in Cuba.
26 Mario del Cueto,‘El problema social de la zafra’,Bohemia, 9 January 1955.
27 Bohemia, 23 January 1955.
28 Pardo Llada,‘La pobre zafra de 55’,Bohemia, 6 February 1955.
29 Bohemia, 30 January 1955.
30 Bohemia, 6 February 1955.
8minority of the FNTA leadership, while the employers had been looking for a much greater
cut in their wage bill.31 The Ministry of Labour repaid the FNTA bureaucracy for their help
in defusing the situation by delaying the scheduled union elections in which it was unlikely
that any of the mujalistas on the executive could have retained their seats.32 Feelings in the
industry were further inflamed by reports of corruption in the sugar workers’pension fund,
involving both the government and the FNTA bureaucracy,33 while pressure increased when
the American sugar quota was threatened with reduction following protectionist pressure from
southern US sugar farmers.34
US sugar quota and the failure of a strategy
The United States had never been part of the International Sugar Market, having sufficient
supplies from its own internal sources and from its client states such as Cuba and the
Philippines. Following US intervention in the Cuban War of Independence, known to the
Americans as the Spanish-American War, the island only received its independence in 1902
on condition that the new constitution contained a clause, known as the Platt Amendment,
which allowed the US to intervene in Cuban affairs should it consider it necessary. This
constitutional arrangement was accompanied by a Treaty of Reciprocity, which structured
economic relations between the two countries to the advantage of the United States. In these
circumstances, US capital had come to dominate the Cuban economy in general and the sugar
industry in particular. Initially, Cuba had supplied almost the entire US market and then sold
any excess on the world market, but the Jones-Costigan Act, passed by the US Congress in
May 1934, imposed a system of quotas that were not mutually negotiated, but decided
unilaterally by the US Secretary of Agriculture.35 This reduced the Cuban share of the US
market from 50 percent down to 30 percent. By the early 1950s the United States was only
buying about half of the Cuban sugar crop; but the US quota system was complicated
because, as well as its commercial function, it had a political dimension. So, in May 1955,
following an aggressive campaign led by Senator Allan Elender, the US Senate passed a new
‘Sugar Law’,which reduced Cuba’s previously held right to 96 percent of any increase in US
consumption down to 29.5 percent, which, according to Oscar Pino Santos writing at the time,
would cost Cuba nearly 100,000 tons.36 This additional threat to Cuban sugar production,
which occurred despite a visit to Washington by a united delegation of Cuban employers and
workers’leaders of all factions,37 served to increase anti-imperialist feeling amongst sugar
workers.
These feelings reinforced working-class nationalist politics and gave credence to ideas
of economic nationalism as a solution to poverty and insecurity, thus further undermining the
credibility of the London Sugar Agreement, which was popularly seen as surrendering to
foreign interests.38 It has been common since the triumph of the revolution to assume that
opposition to foreign ownership was directed entirely against the United States. However, it
should be remembered that European capital held a significant minority stake in the Cuban
31 NA, FO 371/108990 - AK1015/3 (1954).
32 Bohemia, 24 February 1955.
33 Sterling Marquez,‘Injusticia con el trabajador del azúcar’& Mario del Cueto Otro 'Escándalo en el Retiro
Azucarero’,Bohemia, 17 April 1955b.
34 Bohemia, 26 June, 3 & 10 July 1955.
35 Stuart Marshall Jamieson, Labor Unionism in American Agriculture, New York: Arno Press, 1976, pp.243-4.
36 Oscar Pino Santos, 'La cuota azucarera de Cuba en Estados Unidos' Carteles, 13 February 1955 pp.46-8
37 Bohemia, 14 May 1955.
38 Carlos Casteñeda,‘Azucar: causa común de todo un pueblo’,Bohemia, 13 July 1955.
9economy, and this was just as bitterly resented when it appeared to threaten the perceived
Cuban national interest.
As the failure of the London Sugar Agreement to prevent the continuing decline in
sugar prices was becoming increasingly obvious, the government’s inability to think of an
alternative strategy further reduced its standing. Peru and Indonesia had refused to join, Brazil
and Formosa were unsatisfied with their quota and left, while many importers were never
included and the British Commonwealth received privileges that, given that London was the
home of the agreement, served to further weaken the agreement’s credibility. By early 1955,
the price of sugar had reached 3.15¢ per pound, which was 10 points lower than the agreed
minimum. Cuba appeared to be taking the majority of the restriction, with a 30 percent
reduction on the production levels of 1952, the impact of which would be much worse if the
US quota were to be cut further as now seemed likely.39 The London Sugar Agreement
appears from these figures to be working against Cuba’s interests, but no viable alternative
was offered at the time. At least remaining a party to the agreement maintained a level of
profitability for the employers and, if this was at the expense of working-class employment
and living standards, this was in line with the Batista government’s approach to industrial
relations in general.40 Yet living standards for agricultural workers were already appalling.
The figures contained in the 1957 report of the Agrupación Católica Universitaria are
graphic: 64 percent with no proper sanitation, 43 percent illiteracy, 91 percent undernourished
and so on.41 Cuba’s sugar workers therefore had little to lose and, while hardship does not
necessarily generate militancy, when combined with a sense of injustice there is potential for
industrial action.
Strike
As the 1955 tiempo muerto42 progressed, workers at local union meetings started formulating
their demands –a process that the authorities violently tried to intimidate up and down the
country. The police attack on the workers of Central Washington in Las Villas was one
example of many, but one which received wider attention because it was owned by Batista
himself. When the Central Washington workers met in August 1955 to discuss the threat of 40
redundancies, the police attacked the assembly, leaving 29 workers hospitalised with gunshot
and machete wounds.43 The sugar workers responded by occupying the site hospital and
began a hunger strike, while their families staged a sit-in, first of all in the school, then, after
they had been ejected from there, they occupied the church and the ayuntamiento (town hall).
Solidarity strikes spread through the region, and Becquer and Rodriguez–known as‘los Dos
Conrados’ –occupied the church tower.44 As the confrontation escalated, the Ministry of
Labour intervened, conceded to the workers and the redundancies are withdrawn.45
In this atmosphere, the provincial union in Las Villas passed a resolution opposing the
employers over the late start to repairs in the sugar-processing plants and the threat of ten
39 Bohemia, 4 September 1955.
40 Steve Cushion,‘Organised Labour under Batista’, International Journal of Cuban Studies, 3 (June 2009).
41 Agrupación Católica Universitaria,‘Encuentra de Trabajadores Rurales, 1956-57’, Economía y Desarrollo
(July-August 1972), pp.188-212.
42 Literally the‘dead time’,as the period outside the sugar harvest was known, when sugar workers had no
income from their trade and had to subsist as best they could on other employment, subsistence farming etc.
43 Carta Semanal, 24 August & 14 September 1955.
44 Bohemia, 11 September 1955.
45 Carta Semanal, 6 November 1955.
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thousand redundancies, while rejecting what they saw as a return to 1950 wage levels. In
November, the union’splenaria nacional supported this approach and demanded a five
million ton harvest, an end to wage cuts and the restoration of the previous year’s 7.31 percent
cut, along with the reinstatement of all sacked workers, pay for ‘super-producción’46 and
derogation of Clause 4 of decree 3164, which allowed employers to leave vacancies
unfilled.47 They also raised the demand for full payment of the‘diferencial’.
Before the start of each year’s sugar harvest, it had been the agreement to pay the
workers a bonus, known as the diferencial, based on the sugar price in the United States,
which, because the US operated outside the world market, bore scant relation to the
international sugar price. No diferencial had been paid since 1951, but the idea captured the
sugar workers’imagination this year.48 Alfredo Menendez, an economist in the Ministry of
Sugar who was secretly a member of the PSP, used his access to the Ministry’s data to
calculate that the diferencial should be 9 percent,49 although Conrado Rodriguez popularised
the figure of 7.5 percent. The fact that confrontation should erupt over the diferencial
highlights the gulf of comprehension that existed between employers and employed in the
sugar industry. To the employers, the fact that the international price had dropped meant that
they considered that they had a reduced ability to pay their wage bill and that a bonus that
dated back to better times was unacceptable. The majority of workers, on the other hand,
already living in conditions of miserable poverty,50 felt that they were being made to bear the
brunt of a crisis not of their making and thus the fight over the diferencial became hugely
symbolic for both sides.
The government, with the support of the CTC bureaucracy, refused to negotiate, while
the leaders of the FNTA denounced the workers’demands as unreasonable.51 Undeterred,
starting in Las Villas province, but soon spreading nationwide, five-hundred thousand sugar
workers went on strike at the end of December and the union leadership, unable to stop the
movement, tried to place themselves at its head. Then, following negotiations with Batista,
the FNTA ordered a return to work on 29 December, saying that the government had agreed
to their demands. Becquer and the opposition, calling themselves the Frente Azucarero de
Acción Sindical, called for a continuation of the struggle as the government decreed a
diferencial of only 4.02 percent,52 which was calculated to be worth only 6 million pesos to
the workers, considerably short of the 18 million pesos that it would have cost to pay the full
demand.53
When faced with a level of repression only previously used to attack militant students,
the sugar workers themselves turned to violence and set up road blocks, burnt cane fields and
occupied town halls and city centres: actions that resulted in hundreds arrested or wounded,
46 Superproduction is defined as the increase in production due to mechanisation. It was a common demand of
Cuban workers in the face of such mechanisation that they be paid the same as before the new machinery
arrived. This was strongly contested by the employers for whom mechanisation was aimed at reducing the wage
bill.
47 Carta Semanal, 23 November 1955.
48 Bohemia, 1 January 1956.
49 Interview with Alfredo Menendez, March 2009.
50 Samuel Feijoo,‘Desocupación endémica, el ciclo del tiempo muerto’, Bohemia, 7 October 1956.
51 Conrado Rodríguez,‘La industria azucarera ha obtenido fabulosas ganancias’, Bohemia 18 December 1955,
p.71.
52 Bohemia, 8 January 1956.
53 Angelina Rojas Blaquier, 1955–Crónica de una marcha ascendente, Havana: Instituto de Historia de Cuba,
1998 pp.68-76.
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with several strikers being killed.54 In addition to a complete stoppage of the sugar industry,
there were solidarity strikes on the railways and in the docks and, despite the official
instruction to return to work from the CTC, normal working was not fully resumed until the
4th or 5th of January. This confrontation destroyed many illusions and convinced a significant
minority of workers that there was no longer any reformist solution to their problems.55 The
violence used by the state against strikers had forged a bond of solidarity between workers
and students as they realised they had a common enemy.
Students had been the only sector of society to actively oppose the 1952 coup and
their opposition, as well as the consequent repression, had grown with the election of the
revolutionary nationalist José Antonio Echeverría as leader of the student union, the FEU
(university students’ union). Police violence against the students came to a head on 7
December 1955, with an attack on a student demonstration in Santiago;56 and the FEU called
for solidarity from workers to be shown by a five-minute general strike on the 14th. Despite
virulent CTC opposition, this short demonstration was very well supported, particularly in
Havana, Santiago and Matanzas, indicating a growing disillusion with both the official unions
and the regime. At the same time, it helped to raise political tensions and increased the self-
confidence of the sugar workers. The FEU repaid this solidarity by sending student organisers
out into the sugar fields to help the strikers. The support that they showed in the sugar strike
gave the FEU enormous credibility amongst workers and the revolutionary nationalist politics
of the student activists gained a greater working-class following. When a section of the trade-
union leadership tried to publicly organise against what they saw as a betrayal, they were
disciplined by the CTC bureaucracy and turned again to the FEU for help.
Becquer, Rodriguez, Anibal Alvarez and Jorge Cruz were removed from the FNTA
executive and some provincial leaders were expelled, with the CTC using the police to
enforce the decision. New officials were imposed by the Ministry of Labour to replace them,
but in Las Villas and Camaguey no local sugar workers were available, so outsiders had to be
used. Having been barred from their own building by the police, the opposition met in the
parliament building, using Conrado Rodriguez’s position as congressional deputy, and a clear
majority of the FNTA executive attended. They declared themselves the real leadership of the
union and proposed to go to court to establish it –a course of action that came to nothing.57
Attempts to form a breakaway sugar-workers’union with the help of the FEU were equally
unsuccessful as the Ministry of Labour and the trade-union bureaucracy worked together
using the intervention procedures to isolate the opposition.58 Becquer gave up the struggle in
the official union and, by the end of 1956, had joined Fidel Castro’s Movimiento
Revolucionario del 26 de Julio (M-26-7) and went underground, working in Oriente province
to build a clandestine sugar-workers’organisation in support of the rebel army.
The news magazine Bohemia argued at the time that the diferencial represented much
more than the money, but was rather a question of workers’rights and social justice.59
Although it was several days before normal working was fully resumed, the final outcome
was a success for the government, even though many employers did not see it that way,
expecting the complete smashing of all resistance. Thus the Economist Intelligence Unit,
54 Julio García Oliveres, José Antonio Echeverría: la lucha estudiantil contra Batista, Havana: Editora Política,
1979, p.258.
55 Pérez-Stable (1999), p.55.
56 Bohemia, 11 December 1955.
57 Bohemia, 15 January 1956.
58 Bohemia, 22 January 1956.
59 Andrés Valdespino,‘Más allá del diferencial’,Bohemia, 22 January 1956.
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having hoped in February 1955 that Batista “would override labour opposition”,60 expressed
disappointment in February of the following year saying:“A strike of 500,000 sugar and dock
workers was settled in the short term by a government decision in favour of the workers”.61
This clearly demonstrates the dilemma facing the Batista regime: he was not able to meet the
employers’expectations of a destruction of working-class power because he needed the
support of the trade-union bureaucracy, who could not compromise to the extent the
employers required without losing all credibility and therefore their usefulness to the regime.
Outcome and the Frente Obrero Nacional Unido
The change in attitude of many trade unionists which came out of the sugar-workers’strike
equally helped the M-26-7 with recruitment amongst disillusioned workers. The role of the
FEU in extending revolutionary nationalist politics has already been discussed, but they were
in no position to profit from it because, although the FEU’s influence was hegemonic in the
university, its membership was restricted to students. For those who wished to oppose the
regime but who did not trust the communists or thought they were too moderate, the M-26-7
was the logical choice, not only amongst sugar workers but in other industrial sectors as well,
there having been strikes in 1955 of railway workers, bank workers, dockers, textile workers,
brewers and many others.
In terms of the relationship between militant workers and the M-26-7, therefore, it
may be argued that the class struggle in 1955 was a crucial turning point. Up to that moment,
mujalismo had, while suppressing their political aspirations, defended workers’wages and
conditions adequately enough to neutralise organised labour and isolate militant activists.
The CTC bureaucracy’s shameless support of Batista, despite the increasing
involvement of the police in industrial relations, undermined the CTC’s credibility and
thereby allowed the M-26-7 to gain influence and important new recruits, particularly in Las
Villas and Oriente. However, the importance of the support given to Batista by Mujal and the
CTC bureaucracy cannot be overestimated. Control of the formal trade-union structures by its
allies had given the regime a certain legitimacy in its early days, but the class struggles of
1955 exposed the inadequacies of the mujalista leadership of the trade unions and started the
transfer of working-class support to the rebels. The defeat of the major class battles of 1955
proved to a significant layer of militants that non-violent trade unionism was no longer an
option and, if they wanted to defeat the employers’productivity offensive, they needed armed
support.
Starting in the west of the island, the M-26-7 built up an impressive underground
working-class organisation, most powerfully seen in the Guantánamo region, where they
organised several political general strikes in which sugar workers were actively involved.
Thus, for example, during the strike which started on 30 November 1956, the workers in the
processing plant of the ‘Ermita’sugar estate, where the M-26-7 had two active cells,
successfully attacked the police barracks on the plantation.62 This combination of mass action
with armed resistance and sabotage, called ‘sindicalismo beligerente’by its proponents,
60 Economist Intelligence Unit, ‘Cuba, Dominican Republic and Puerto Rico’,Quarterly Economic Review 9
(February 1955).
61 Economist Intelligence Unit,‘Cuba, Dominican Republic and Puerto Rico’,Quarterly Economic Review 13
(February 1956).
62 Comisión Nacional de Historia, Departamento Obrero II Frente Oriental‘Frank Pais’(1980), Provincia
Guantánamo, manuscript.
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struck a chord with many sugar workers, who had a tradition of burning cane fields when they
went on strike which went back to the 1930s.63
The Batista regime found itself undermined by this approach, while its bourgeois
supporters became increasingly frustrated by the slow progress in achieving the level of
productivity increases that they wanted. An example of this is the uneven and, from the
employers’point of view, unsatisfactory failure to impose bulk loading of sugar in the docks
because of the joint resistance of dockers, railwaymen and sugar workers.
In November 1958, following negotiations between the M-26-7 Sección Obrera
(Workers’ Section) and the PSP-controlled Comité Nacional por la Defensa de las Demandas
Obreras (National Committee for the Defence of Workers’ Demands), the Frente Obrero
Nacional Unido (FONU– United National Workers’ Front) was set up. This new organisation
adopted a twelve-point programme that called for a 20 percent wage increase, opposition to
mechanisation along with other measures against unemployment, an end to racial
discrimination, more social protection for women, children and the unemployed, for the
reinstatement of victimised workers, trade-union democracy and the end to the compulsory
check-off as well as for the reinstatement of the 1940 constitution.64 This last demand
represented much more to workers than a desire for political democracy, as the 1940
constitution contained important employment rights that they had lost under the Batista
regime.65 On 8 December, Raul Castro, who commanded the‘Frank País Second Front’in the
Sierra Cristal mountains, convened, in the name of the FONU, a congress of workers’
delegates that endorsed the twelve-point programme as well as formally repudiating the
mujalista control of the CTC, whilst adding to the list some demands specific to the sugar
industry,66 which were subsequently endorsed at the ‘First National Conference of Sugar
Workers in Liberated Territory’held on 20 and 21 December in the area controlled by Camilo
Cienfuegos.67 The report of this conference made a comparison between the years 1957 and
1951, which both had the same harvest of about 5 million tons, while the sugar price for 1957
had risen back to 5.2¢ per pound, similar to the price of 5.29¢ per pound in 1951. The profits
declared for 1951 had been 106 million pesos but this figure had risen to 135 million pesos in
1957 while the total wage bill, at 321 million pesos, was 90 million pesos less. This was
partly because of wage cuts and partly because increased mechanisation had enabled the same
volume to be harvested in thirteen days less. The conference went on to demand increases that
would compensate them for the loss and, symbolically, demanded a diferencial of 10 percent.
It is significant that the London Sugar Agreement was given no credit for the higher
international sugar price, rather this was attributed to the sugar workers’strike in Hawaii, a
poor beet harvest in Europe, increased Russian purchases, increased international tension over
the Suez crisis and a drought in Puerto Rico. So, while the agreement had probably prevented
the complete collapse of the Cuba sugar industry and would have contributed to the price rise
on the world market, by the end of 1958 very few people in Cuba were prepared to give
Batista and his policies credit for anything. In particular, the sugar workers themselves had
born the brunt of the policy and appeared in no mood to be charitable. The delegates
displayed this mood by planning a national strike for the forthcoming harvest, pledging 20
percent of any wage gains to the rebel army and endorsing the strategy of the M-26-7 for a
63 Carr (1996).
64 Robert Jackson Alexander, A History of Organized Labor in Cuba, Westport: Praeger, 2002, p.161.
65 Robin Blackburn,‘Prologue to the Cuban Revolution’, New Left Review, 1:21 (October 1963), p.70.
66 Pedro Cardona Bory,Memorias del congreso obrero en armas, Segundo Frente ‘Frank País’, Cuba: Pilar
Casada González, c.1995.
67 Ramón Bonachea & Marta San Martín, The Cuban Insurrection, 1952-1959, New Brunswick: Transaction
Books, 1974 p.278.
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revolutionary general strike supported by armed guerrilla action –a strategy that was now
showing signs of success.68
The armed forces, while they had demonstrated ruthless efficiency when shooting
down poorly armed students or unarmed striking workers, were not nearly so determined
when faced with well trained and politically motivated guerrillas who rapidly gained the
military upper hand in the second half of 1958. Bonachea recalls the parallel growth in
financial support coming from workers through late summer and autumn, as well as the
increase in membership of the M-26-7 Sección Obrera, which had an estimated membership
of 15,000 by the end of the year.69
This effort bore fruit and, by the time Batista fled in January 1959, Fidel Castro was
able to call a general strike to forestall the threatened military coup that, particularly if it had
an honourable, patriotic officer at its head, could have split some of the middle-class support
away from the M-26-7 and prolonged the civil war.70 This strike also demonstrated the
hegemony of the M-26-7 and enabled them to form a government without other members of
the opposition, a hegemony shown by their ability to take complete control of the purged
CTC, which went on to become the main mobilising force in the crucial first year of the
revolutionary government.
Conclusion
The London Sugar Agreement of 1953 was signed to considerable acclaim, with only a few
sceptics pointing out the possible dangers.71 Cuban participation in the scheme might have
seemed at the time the only way to maintain profitability in Cuba’s main industry and
principal source of income, but doing so required a severe reduction in living standards for the
island’s sugar workers. The fact that there was probably no other choice within the terms of
the world market was irrelevant to those workers who saw the agreement as an attempt to
maintain their employers’profits at their expense; an inevitable contradiction in a proposed
cut in production when workers are paid by the hour but their employers profits depend on an
internationally determined price. This contradiction expressed itself in an industrial dispute
that ended unsatisfactorily for both sides. A combination of state violence and trade-union
corruption prevented the workers gaining their demands, while the fact that the employers had
to make some concessions caused displeasure amongst the owners of the sugar industry who
felt that their profitability was being threatened. Not only were the workers being expected to
sacrifice their already inadequate living standards in the interest of profit, many of the
companies who would benefit were owned by American capital. Add to this that the London
Sugar Agreement could be interpreted as a mechanism that mainly benefited the importing
nations, and it is easy to see how this could be interpreted as a capitulation to foreign interests
and give credence to ideas of economic nationalism. This interpretation was confirmed in the
popular imagination by the cut in the US sugar quota. In these circumstances the patriotic
politics of Fidel Castro and the 26th July Movement started to gain influence amongst the
Cuban working class. In previous times, the Cuban workers had been able to defend their
interests by traditional reformist methods of struggle, but these had failed when confronted by
68 Informe de la conferencia de obreros azucareros convocada por el FONU (1958), IHC archives, ref.
1/8.15/2.1/2-22.
69 Bonachea & San Martin (1974), p.263; and Alexander (2002), p.159.
70 K. S. Karol, Guerrillas in Power: The Course of the Cuban Revolution, New York: Hill & Wang, 1970,
pp.167-8.
71 Swerling (1954).
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brutal dictatorship that had both corrupted the unions and was prepared to use force to break
strikes. This added considerably to the attraction of the M-26-7 as they provided an armed
revolutionary alternative now that reformist methods had failed.
Two of the prerequisites for a revolutionary situation are the absence of a reformist
solution to a society’s problems and the loss of confidence in the system by the ruling class.72
As outlined in the World Bank report, Cuba could no longer sustain its wage and employment
levels within the constraints of the capitalist system and the government attempted to solve its
economic problems by a drastic reduction in workers’living standards, which could only be
achieved by the destruction of organised labour’s ability to resist. The dictatorship’s failure to
deliver the required productivity advances lost it the support of the bourgeoisie, while the
brutal methods employed in the attempt drove the majority of workers to welcome a
revolutionary solution to their problems. The increasing military success of the rebel army
through the second half of 1958, along with the progressive disintegration of the repressive
forces of the state gave Cubans a stark choice; the fact that the workers responded with an
overwhelmingly successful general strike when called upon by Fidel Castro in January 1959
demonstrates this.
While it would be wrong to propose a monocausal link between the London Sugar
Agreement and the Revolution, it can be seen as a significant contributing factor, exacerbating
the existing economic crisis. This did not make the revolution inevitable, but it did establish
the circumstances in which the agency of sugar workers could operate and play an important
part in the triumph of the revolution.
72 Jorge Ibarra Guitart, El fracaso de los moderados en Cuba, Havana: Editora Política, 2000, pp.2-3.
16
References
Agrupación Católica Universitaria,‘Encuentra de Trabajadores Rurales, 1956-57’, Economía
y Desarrollo, (July-August 1972), pp.188-212
Alexander, Robert Jackson, A History of Organized Labor in Cuba, Westport, Conn: Praeger,
2002
Blackburn, Robin,‘Prologue to the Cuban Revolution’, New Left Review, 1:21 (October
1963), pp.52-91
Bonachea, Ramón & San Martín, Marta, 1974, The Cuban Insurrection, 1952-1959, New
Brunswick, N.J: Transaction Books
Cardona Bory, Pedro, Memorias del Congreso Obrero en Armas, Segundo Frente‘Frank
País’, Cuba: Pilar Casada Gonzalez, c.1995
Carr, Barry,‘Mill Occupations and Soviets: The Mobilisation of Sugar Workers in Cuba
1917-1933’, Journal of Latin American Studies, 28:1 (1996), pp.129-58
Casteñeda, Carlos, ‘Azucar: causa común de todo un pueblo’, Bohemia, 13 July 1955
Cepero Bonilla, Raúl,‘Política azucarera’, in Obras históricas, Havana: Instituto de Historia,
1963
Chávez Alvarez, Clara Emma, Matanzas de rojo y negro 1952-1958, Matanzas: Ediciones
Matanzas, 2007
Cueto, Mario del,‘El problema social de la zafra’, Bohemia, 9 January 1955
Cueto, Mario del, ‘Otro escándalo en el retiro azucarero’, Bohemia, 17 April 1955
Cushion, Steve,‘Organised Labour under Batista’, International Journal of Cuban Studies, 3
(June 2009), at http://www.cubastudiesjournal.org/issue-3/historical-
connections/organised-labour-under-batista.cfm
Dye, Alan and Sicotte, Richard,‘The U.S. Sugar Program and the Cuban Revolution’,
Journal of Economic History, 64:3, pp.673-704
Economist Inteligence Unit, ‘Cuba, Dominican Republic and Puerto Rico’, Quarterly 
Economic Review 9 (February 1955)
Economist Inteligence Unit, ‘Cuba, Dominican Republic and Puerto Rico’, Quarterly 
Economic Review 13 (February 1956)
Feijoo, Samuel,‘Desocupación endémica, el ciclo del tiempo muerto’, Bohemia, 7 October
1956
García Oliveres, Julio, José Antonio Echeverría: la lucha estudiantil contra Batista, Havana:
Editora Política, 1979
Gerber, David J.,‘The United States Sugar Quota Program: A Study in the Direct
Congressional Control of Imports’, Journal of Law and Economics, 19:1, pp.103-47
Guerra, José Antonio,‘La industria azucarera cubana: 1932-1957’, Diario de la Marina, 15
September 1957
Ibarra Guitart, Jorge, El fracaso de los moderados en Cuba, Havana: Editora Política, 2000
Jamieson, Stuart Marshall, Labor Unionism in American Agriculture, New York: Arno Press,
1976
17
Karol, K. S., Guerrillas in Power : The Course of the Cuban Revolution, New York: Hill &
Wang, 1970
Márquez, Sterling, ‘Injusticia con el trabajador del azúcar’, Bohemia, 17 April 1955
O’Connor, James, The Origins of Socialism in Cuba, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1970
Pardo Llada,‘La pobre zafra de 55’, Bohemia, 6 February 1955
Pérez-Stable, Marrifeli, The Cuban Revolution, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999
Pinos Santos, Oscar,‘La cuota azucarera de Cuba en Estados Unidos’, Carteles, 13 February
1955 pp.46-8
Pino Santos, Oscar, Los años 50, Havana: Editorial Arte y Literatura, 2008
Pollitt, Brian H.,‘The Cuban Sugar Economy and the Great Depression’, Bulletin of Latin
American Research, 3:2 (1984), pp.3-28
Pollitt, Brian H., 2004,‘The Rise and Fall of the Cuban Sugar Economy’,Journal of Latin
American Studies, 36:2 (2004), pp.319-48
Rodriguez, Conrado,‘La industrial azucarera ha obtenido fabulosas ganancias’, Bohemia, 18
December 1955, p.71
Rojas Blaquier, Angelina, 1955 - Crónica de una marcha ascendente, Havana: Instituto de
Historia de Cuba, 1998
Silva Leon, Arnaldo, Cuba y el mercado internacional azucarero, Havana: Editorial de
Ciencias Sociales, 1975
Spalding, Hobart, Organized Labor in Latin America : historical case studies of workers in
dependent societies, New York: New York University Press, 1977
Swerling, Boris C.,‘The International Sugar Agreement of 1953’, American Economic
Review, 44:5 (December 1954), pp.837-53
Truslow, Francis Adams, Report on Cuba, Washington DC: International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development, 1951
Valdespino, Andres,‘Mas allá del Diferencial’, Bohemia, 22 January 1956
18
Other Commodities of Empire Working Papers
WP01: Sandip Hazareesingh,‘“Chasing commodities over the surface of the globe”: shipping, port development
and the making of networks between Glasgow and Bombay, c.1850-1880’(October 2007)
WP02: Jonathan Curry-Machado,‘Sub-imperial globalisation and the phoenix of empire: sugar, engineering and
commerce in nineteenth century Cuba’(October 2007)
WP03: Jean Stubbs,‘Reinventing mecca: tobacco in the Dominican Republic, 1763-2007’(October 2007)
WP04: Miguel Suárez Bosa,‘The role of the Canary Islands in the Atlantic coal route from the end of the
nineteenth century to the beginning of the twentieth century: corporate strategies’(January 2008)
WP05: Ayodeji Olukoju,‘The United Kingdom and the political economy of the global oil-producing nuts and
seeds during the 1930s’(January 2008)
WP06: Roberto Davini,‘A global commodity within a rising empire: the history of Bengali raw silk as
connective interplay between the Company Bahadur, the Bengali local economy and society, and the
universal Italian model, c.1750-c.1830’(February 2008)
WP07: Deana Heath,‘Obscenity, empire and global networks’(April 2008)
WP08: David Hyde,‘Global coffee and decolonisation in Kenya: overproduction, quotas and rural restructuring’
(July 2008)
WP09: Vibha Arora,‘Routing the commodities of empire through Sikkim (1817-1906)’(July 2008)
WP10: Kaori O’Connor,‘Beyond‘exotic groceries’: tapioca-cassava, a hidden commodity of empire’(January
2009)
WP11: Jonathan Robins,‘“The Black Man’s Crop”: cotton, imperialism and public-private development in
Britain’s African colonies, 1900-1918’(September 2009)
WP12: Jelmer Vos,‘Of stocks and barter: John Holt and the Kongo rubber trade, 1906-1910’(September 2009)
WP13: Alan Pryor,‘Indian Pale Ale: an icon of empire’(November 2009)
WP14: William G. Clarence Smith,‘The battle for rubber in the Second World War: cooperation and resistance’
(November 2009)
All Commodities of Empire Working Papers can be downloaded from the Commodities of Empire website, at
http://www.open.ac.uk/Arts/ferguson-centre/commodities-of-empire/working-papers/index.htm.
19
Series Editor: Dr Jonathan Curry-Machado (ISA)
Project Directors: Dr Sandip Hazareesingh (OU) and Prof. Jean Stubbs (ISA)
Commodities of Empire is a joint research collaboration between the Open
University's Ferguson Centre for African and Asian Studies and the
University of London’s Institute for the Study of the Americas. These
two institutions form the nucleus of a growing international network of
researchers and research centres.
The mutually reinforcing relationship between ‘commodities’and ‘empires’has long been
recognised. Over the last six centuries the quest for profits has driven imperial expansion,
with the global trade in commodities fuelling the ongoing industrial revolution. These
‘commodities of empire’, which became transnationally mobilised in ever larger quantities,
included foodstuffs (wheat, rice, bananas); industrial crops (cotton, rubber, linseed and
palm oils); stimulants (sugar, tea, coffee, cocoa, tobacco and opium); and ores (tin,
copper, gold, diamonds). Their expanded production and global movements brought vast
spatial, social, economic and cultural changes to both metropoles and colonies.
In the Commodities of Empire project we explore the networks through which such
commodities circulated within, and in the spaces between, empires. We are particularly
attentive to local processes –originating in Africa, Asia, the Caribbean and Latin America –
which significantly influenced the outcome of the encounter between the world economy
and regional societies, doing so through a comparative approach that explores the
experiences of peoples subjected to different imperial hegemonies.
The following key research questions inform the work of project:
1) The networks through which commodities were produced and circulated within,
between and beyond empires;
2) The interlinking ‘systems’(political-military, agricultural labour, commercial, maritime,
industrial production, social communication, technological knowledge) that were
themselves evolving during the colonial period, and through which these commodity
networks functioned;
3) The impact of agents in the periphery on the establishment and development of
commodity networks: as instigators and promoters; through their social, cultural and
technological resistance; or through the production of anti-commodities;
4) The impact of commodity circulation both on the periphery, and on the economic,
social and cultural life of the metropoles;
5) The interrogation of the concept of ‘globalisation’through the study of the historical
movement and impact of commodities.
www.open.ac.uk/Arts/ferguson-centre/commodities-of-empire/index
The Ferguson Centre for
African and Asian Studies
The Open University
Walton Hall
Milton Keynes
MK7 6AA
Institute for the Study
of the Americas
University of London
Senate House
Malet Street
London WC1E 7HU
